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COMMENT
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT EXCLUDING
RESPONSIBILITY
A Psychiatric View of the American Law Institute:
Model Penal Code Proposal
Lawrence Zelic Freedman, M.D., Manfred Guffmacher, M.D.,
and Winfred Overholser, M.D.*
It is a truism that in any decision-making process the freer the flow
of relevant information the greater the chances that the decision will
be rational and just. Any impediment to pertinent communication
increases the probability that irrational or-in the court of law-
unjust decisions will be made. The clinical insights of psychiatry
can accurately reflect the state of its knowledge and be efficiently
utilized by courts only when the procedures for testifying do not
suppress or distort the information. The fewer the restrictions im-
posed on the psychiatrist testifying in court, the greater the resources
upon which the courts can draw.
The considerations which we are presenting arise from and are
restricted to our area of training, competency and primary interest-
mental disease and mental defect. Only insofar as the proposal
attempts to incorporate psychiatric disease need the Committee grant
our advice any more weight than that of other interested laymen.
However, so far as it does, we think it reasonable to hold that the
unanimous opinion of the three psychiatric members of the Advisory
Committee ought to be weighed as representative of the thinking of
many of our colleagues in psychiatry upon whom the success of any
formula depends.
There is now a body of experience based on the history of the
M'Naghten formula which may guide us to avoid a repetition of
difficulties arising from earlier efforts. For example, a serious
impediment to meaningful communication between psychiatrists and
lawyers in the M'Naghten formula is the psychiatrists' mistaken
assumption that M'Naghten makes an attempt to define insanity
which they consider in error. Lawyers see it as a statement of the
*Lawrence Zelic Freedman, Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences. Manfred Guttmacher, Chief Medical Officer, Supreme Bench
of Baltimore. Winfred Overlholser, Superintendent, Saint Elizabeth's Hospital,
Washington, D. C.
1. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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conditions under which an accused person might be exculpated from
guilt and from being stigmatized as a criminal.
The traditional reluctance of psychiatrists to testify in courts under
the M'Naghten formula arises in large part from the frustration of
language which the law requires of them. Many lawyers have failed
to realize that freedom of psychiatric testifying is not identical with
extension of psychiatric concepts in the procedures and decisions of
the courts. Courts can only benefit from having the greatest possible
clarity of exposition of psychiatric testimony, no matter what stand-
ards it sets for responsibility.
Section Four of the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute,2 devoted to Responsibility, has a dual function: It sets up
the criteria by which, according to law, mental disease or defect may
exclude responsibility. Responsibility is not a qualitative or quantita-
tive intrinsic attribute of a person; it is, in this context, a legal judg-
ment. Since, however, "the deed does not make the criminal unless
the mind is criminal," 3 the state of mind must be ascertained and a
pathological state of mind is a psychiatric problem. However, the
gauge for determining legal exculpation is not suitable for the
differential diagnosis of psychiatric disability.
So, Section Four also sets up standards. It guides and it limits the
communications of the psychiatrist concerning mental disease and
defect to the judge and the jury who are to make the legal decision.
It is this second and to some extent competing function which con-
cerns us. Confusion arises from this paradoxical effort to combine in
one formula: (1) the criteria by which the courts will hold a man
not legally responsible (i.e., punishable) ; and (2) the conditions for
the exposition of the psychiatrist's knowledge.
The question clearly should be: How may the courts optimally
elicit testimony from the psychiatrist concerning psychopathology
so that its own legal question concerning responsibility may be an-
swered with maximum information at its disposal?
The two major formulae, competing to supplant M'Naghten, are the
proposed American Law Institute prescription and the Durham
2. Model Penal Code § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956), stating in part:
Section 4.01-
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct.
3. Ibid.
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Decision. 4 In our view both are refreshing and encouraging advances
over M'Naghten and reveal significant agreement. The similarities
between them might be summarized as follows: (1) each is intended
to free from responsibility a man who has committed an illegal act
which is the result of, or the product of, mental disease or defect; (2)
each includes mental pathology-illness, disease or defect; (3) each
rejects exclusively cognitive or intellective approach; (4) neither
formula, presumably, is primarily concerned to define mental illness
but rather to indicate what degree of severity of mental illness pro-
tects an individual against the punitive and stigmatizing impact of
criminal law; (5) each incorporates the concept of causality, with the
words "product of" and "as the result of." Both "product" and
"result" refer to the cause. Cause is the circumstance, condition,
event, which necessarily brings about or contributes to a result.
Within this framework we state our reservations concerning the
American Law Institute formula. We hold that the subtlety, com-
plexity and obscurity of its psychological entities and its actual
intrusion into the field of psychiatric diagnosis unnecessarily limit
the contributions of psychiatry, present and potential, and needlessly
restrict the medical and psychological resources upon which the court
may draw. The legal requirements concerning appreciation of crimi-
nality and conformance of conduct and the negative definition that
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct is not mental
disease effect a gratuitous entrance into medical and scientific arenas
which is unnecessary and may be harmful to the law's purposes.
Specifically, "substantial" and "capacity" are psychologically vague,
ambiguous, unclear and complex quantitative concepts. More impor-
tant, "to appreciate the criminality" is an involved cognitive phrase
at least as likely to lead to confusion as "knowledge of right and
wrong." Further, since criminality is an illegal act withb an aecom-
panying mentaZ state, is there not a logical inconsistency or tautology
here? For if the offender cannot "appreciate the criminality," then
his act is not criminal, and if it is criminal then he must have "appre-
ciated" it.
"To conform his conduct to the requirements of law" is an inverse
restatement of irresistible impulse which has proven to be an almost
unusable defense. To lack "substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law" is to have an irresistible impulse.
The terms "mental disease and defect" specifically exclude "an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other antisocial
4. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), "An accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or mental defect." Id. at 874-75.
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conduct." To refer to mental disease and then to limit its meaning is
to rob the court of the worth of the psychiatrist's expertness precisely
to the degree that it limits his ability to transmit clinical information.
It predisposes to failure in communication. The phrase "mental
disease or defect" should serve as a focus for the communication and
description of the combined behavior, feeling, ideas, of a person so
as to inform judge or jury.
If the courts wish to determine whether mental disease or defect
exists, then the law must use not only the semantics but the substance
of psychiatry. It cannot, for example, meaningfully adopt psychiatric
words, and then appropriate to itself the right to establish psychiatric
diagnostic criteria even by exclusion. It legally excludes forms of
behavior which may themselves be symptomatic of pathology, for anti-
social behavior may be the manifestation of illness. Repeated illegal
or antisocial conduct is a manifestation of a personality, and this
personality may be a sick one. There is a quality of behavior referred
to as alloplastic, most commonly found in the psychopathic person-
ality in which the symptom of psychopathology consists in the acting
out. The manifestation of a man's abnormality may consist precisely
in his repeated or otherwise antisocial conduct. To exclude such
conduct from "mental illness" is to make a psychiatric judgment
eliminating behavioral or conduct disorders.
Apparently there is no insistence on legal formulae in diagnosing
physical diseases, so why in this case? If the physician were similarly
forbidden to use one outstanding symptom as criterion for physical
illness, the absurdity of such an approach would become apparent, or
if he were limited to two tests it would be considered unscientific.
If the intent is to exclude the so-called psychopathic personality
from irresponsibility, it is hard to see how it can succeed in this way.
If the Committee does not want to excuse as psychiatrically ill indi-
viduals the so-called psychopathic or sociopathic personality, this
formula will not serve that purpose, for its implementation depends
upon the testimony of psychiatrists; those who consider psychopathic
or sociopathic personality a mental disease or defect will so testify
and those who do not will not.
In summary, essentially the Model Penal Code formula has added
to the cognitive criteria volitional criteria. It has eliminated be-
havioral criteria except when they are combined with other
phenomena.
The Durham Decision permits free communication of psychiatric
information and the American Law Institute creates road blocks to
such transmission. The Durham formula puts no limitations on psy-
chiatric testimony except those which are implicit in the present
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss3/3
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state of the discipline. The American Law Institute formula requires
psychiatric judgments as to substantial capacity, demands essentially
cognitive criteria concerning capacity to control, and insists upon
including legal criteria in the old tradition by attempting to eliminate
the psychopathic personality.
Neither the Model Penal Code nor the Durham formula resolves
the problems of psychiatry; no legal formula can. Psychiatry is an
incomplete scientific and medical specialty. Indeed all medicine and
science are developing and hence are incomplete. This is reason to
encourage its contribution rather than to emphasize its limitations in
the courts.
For these reasons, we recommend the adoption of the historic
practice of the New Hampshire Court as recently reformulated in the
case of Monte Durham.
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